Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 6

2013

FERC Does Not Have Anti-Manipulation Authority in Financial
Markets
Antony E. Ghee

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl

Recommended Citation
Antony E. Ghee, FERC Does Not Have Anti-Manipulation Authority in Financial Markets, 18 Fordham J.
Corp. & Fin. L. 379 (2012).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol18/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

VOLUME XVIII

2013

NUMBER 2

FORDHAM
JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

FERC DOES NOT HAVE ANTI-MANIPULATION
AUTHORITY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Antony E. Ghee

FERC DOES NOT HAVE ANTI-MANIPULATION
AUTHORITY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Antony E. Ghee
ABSTRACT
Does the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) have
authority to police manipulation in financial markets if that conduct
has an effect on physical markets?
FERC has erroneously argued that it possesses such authority.
Adopting FERC’s view would confound the regulatory landscape
and promote duplicative and even conflicting regulation. FERC’s
mission is clear: to ensure that the rates charged for wholesale sales
of natural gas and electricity are “just and reasonable.” Its
jurisdiction is limited by statute and nothing in the legislative
history, prevailing case law, or public policy suggests that Congress
conferred to FERC powers to police manipulation outside of its
statutorily defined jurisdictional boundaries. Accordingly, FERC
does not, and should not, have authority to police manipulation in
financial markets even if that conduct has an effect on physical
markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Does the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) have
authority to police manipulation in financial markets if that conduct has
an effect on physical markets? The answer depends on (i) whether
FERC’s jurisdiction to police manipulation extends beyond the
jurisdictional boundaries established by the Natural Gas Act of 1938
(“NGA”) (and its corresponding provision in its sister act, the Federal
Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”)) and, if so, (ii) whether that jurisdiction
extends so far as to encroach upon the jurisdiction of financial markets
(such as futures and securities) regulated by other federal agencies such
as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and
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Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). FERC has erroneously
argued that it possesses such authority.1
FERC does not possess the powers of financial regulators. To
conclude otherwise would confound the regulatory landscape and
promote duplicative and even conflicting regulation. FERC’s mission is
clear: to ensure that the rates charged for wholesale sales of natural gas
and electricity are “just and reasonable.”2 Its jurisdiction is limited by
statute and nothing in the legislative history, prevailing case law, or
public policy suggests that Congress conferred to FERC powers to
police manipulation outside of its statutorily defined jurisdictional
boundaries. Accordingly, FERC does not, and should not, have
authority to police manipulation in financial markets even if that
conduct has an effect on physical markets.
I. FERC’S JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO, AND DOES NOT EXTEND
BEYOND, THAT WHICH IS PROVIDED IN NGA §1(b) (AND ITS
COROLLARY IN THE FPA)
A. FERC DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO POLICE MANIPULATION
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS BASED ON ITS HISTORICAL
JURISDICTION AND MANDATE
Since its inception, FERC and its predecessor entities have had
limited jurisdiction and a clearly defined mandate. 3 Congress
established FERC’s predecessor organization, the Federal Power
Commission, in 1920 to coordinate hydroelectric projects under federal
control.4 Congress subsequently expanded FERC’s jurisdiction with the
passage of the FPA and the NGA to close the “Attleboro Gap” 5 and
regulate the sale and transportation of wholesale electricity and natural
gas in interstate commerce, as well as to ensure that prices are “just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.”6 Since enactment, the NGA
1. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 121 FERC ¶ 61,224 (2007)
[hereinafter Order Denying Rehearing] (order denying rehearing).
2. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006); see also FERC Strategic Plan – FERC’s Mission,
FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/strat-plan.asp (last updated Feb. 13, 2012).
3. See History of FERC, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
4. Id.
5. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89
(1927) (holding that the Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation that directly
burdens interstate commerce).
6. History of FERC, supra note 3.
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and FPA have been amended several times in response to regulatory
concerns and energy crises.7 Most recently, the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (“EPAct”) amended the NGA and FPA to address regulatory
deficiencies that were exposed in the California energy crisis. 8 Over
time, as a result of its many amendments, FERC evolved from a ratesetting agency into an agency with enforcement powers.9
Before Congress enacted EPAct, FERC relied on its market
behavior rules to police price manipulation in wholesale electric and
natural gas transactions. 10 The market behavior rules prohibited
“[a]ctions or transactions that [were] without a legitimate business
purpose and that [were] intended to or foreseeably could manipulate
market prices, market conditions, or market rules.”11 The specific types
of transactions targeted by the anti-manipulation authority included, but
were not limited to, wash trades, transactions based on false
information, artificial congestion, and collusion.12
The breadth and scope of FERC’s jurisdiction and its antimanipulation authority were expressly limited by NGA § 1(b) to (i) the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, (ii) the sale in
interstate commerce of natural gas for resale, and (iii) natural gas
companies in such transportation or sale.13 FERC’s jurisdiction did not
reach intrastate sales, retail sales, local distribution of natural gas or
facilities used for its distribution, or the production or gathering of
natural gas. 14 These explicitly-stated exclusions are notable because
“Congress . . . not only prescribed the intended reach of [FERC’s]
power, but also specified the areas into which [FERC’s] power was not

7.
8.

Id.
See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,119 Stat. 594 (2005)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). See also JERRY MARKHAM, 13
COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS § 16:10.60
(2011).
9. See Paul J. Pantano, Jr. & Danielle K. Schonback, Is the FERC’s AntiManipulation Jurisdiction Boundless? FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Oct. 2007, at
1.
10. See id.
11. Id. at n.1.
12. Id.
13. See generally William Demarest, “Traditional” NGA Jurisdictional Limits
Constrain FERC’s Market Manipulation Authority, 31 ENERGY L.J. 471 (2010).
14. Id. at 481.
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to extend.”15 In short, the NGA’s jurisdiction was limited in scope and
FERC’s purpose clearly defined.
Courts interpreting the scope of FERC’s authority have consistently
held that FERC’s jurisdiction is constrained by the “limits Congress
placed upon that power under § 1(b).”16 Thus, FERC’s exercise of its
statutory powers is inextricably linked to whether the activities or
persons in question fall within FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction under the
NGA or FPA, as the case may be. On that basis, case law dictates that
FERC’s jurisdiction extends generally to natural gas companies and
electric utilities. 17 Without an express Congressional authorization,
there is no basis upon which FERC’s historical jurisdiction and statutory
mandate may be expanded to financial markets or any other markets that
were not contemplated by Congress.18
B. THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 DID NOT EMPOWER FERC TO
POLICE MANIPULATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS.
EPAct was enacted in response to California’s energy crisis in 2001
and 2002, during which wholesale energy prices were significantly
inflated above historical levels and energy supplies were significantly
disrupted.19 Inflated prices and energy disruptions were attributable to a
number of factors including manipulative practices of energy traders,
most notably Enron, which allegedly engaged in gaming practices to
exploit regulatory and other dysfunctions in California’s rate structure.20
Although Enron engaged in complex (and even questionable) trading
strategies, it is not disputed that many of the transactions it executed
involved the purchase and sale of energy in physical markets for which
there was a delivery requirement. 21 Therefore these transactions, no
matter how complex or questionable, could theoretically fall within
FERC’s jurisdiction if consummated in interstate commerce. However,
it remains debatable—even today—whether Enron engaged “in
15. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 503
(1949).
16. See Demarest, supra note 13, at 480.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 475.
19. See THOMAS HAZEN & JERRY MARKHAM, 23A BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS
UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 9:17.70 (2011) (discussing the California
energy crisis and the techniques employed by Enron and other energy traders).
20. See id.
21. Id.
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legitimate arbitrages designed to take advantage of imperfections in the
California regulatory structure or whether its activity constituted illegal
price manipulation and fraud”22 based upon FERC’s Market Behavior
Rules.
Given the fallout from the energy crisis and lingering questions
about the legality of Enron’s activities, Congress sought broader
prohibitions against the manipulation of energy and natural gas
markets.23 It is not disputed that Enron purchased and resold energy in
interstate commerce employing strategies that resulted in inflated
prices.24 However, FERC had to consider Enron’s alleged misconduct
in the context of the Market Behavior Rules. 25 Presumably then,
Congress acknowledged the regulatory deficiency and intended to grant
FERC broader powers to police manipulation beyond the limited scope
of the Market Behavior Rules, upon which FERC had traditionally
relied. Considering the grant of power in this context, it is likely that
Congress recognized that certain purchases and sales of energy that are
within FERC’s jurisdiction would arguably not have fallen within the
ambit of the Market Behavior Rules. However, there is nothing in the
legislative history or the resulting amendments to the NGA or FPA to
suggest that the expanded powers were intended to reach beyond
FERC’s jurisdictional boundaries, which is clearly defined in NGA §
1(b).
1. NGA §4A Amendments
EPAct §315 added a new §4A to the NGA.26 The provision, in
relevant part, provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas or the
purchase or sale of transportation services subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance (as those terms are used in section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2006).
See HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 19.
See Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 1.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 315, § 4A, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2006)).
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necessary in the public interest or for the protection of natural gas
27
ratepayers.”

When adopting EPAct § 315, Congress instructed that certain key
terms should be interpreted as they had been under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and particularly
Rule 10b-5, the SEC’s anti-manipulation and anti-deception rule.28 As a
result, when FERC wrote its own rules to implement NGA § 4A, it took
an expansive, but flawed view that it was now empowered to pursue
“manipulative and deceptive conduct by ‘any entity,’—directly or
indirectly—in connection with [any] jurisdictional transaction . . . .”29
Under its own interpretation of its newly granted powers, FERC
took the position that if conduct “affect[s] a regulated transaction in
natural gas or electric energy (including transportation or transmission),
the rules reach such conduct by ‘any entity’ . . . whether or not that
entity itself is regulated by the FERC in other respects.”30 Under this
expansive view, FERC claims that it has jurisdiction to police financial
markets if an entity’s intentional or reckless conduct occurs outside of
its jurisdiction but has an impact on prices within its jurisdiction. 31
FERC misinterprets Rule 10b-5 and reaches an erroneous conclusion
about the reach of its powers granted under NGA § 4A.
a. NGA §4A’s Reference to “Any Entity” Only Refers to Those Entities
Specifically Contemplated as Being Within FERC’s Jurisdiction
FERC argues that its interpretation of “any entity” as used in NGA
§ 4A reflects “Congress’ intent not to limit [FERC’s anti-manipulation
powers] to traditionally NGA-jurisdictional entities.”32 FERC, however,
offers no legislative support for its conclusion and simply reasons that if
Congress had intended to limit the scope of FERC’s authority under
NGA § 4A, it would have specifically identified the entities (e.g.,
“natural gas companies”) that were to be subject to FERC’s anti-

27.
28.
29.

Id.
See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,069–70.
See FERC Prohibition of Natural Gas Market Manipulation, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.1
(2012); see also Allan Horwich, Warnings to the Unwary: Multi-Jurisdictional Federal
Enforcement of Manipulation and Deception in the Energy Markets After the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, 27 ENERGY L.J. 363, 385 (2006).
30. Horwich, supra note 29, at 385.
31. Id. at 386–87.
32. Demarest, supra note 13, at 488.
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manipulation jurisdiction rather than using the phrase “any entity.” 33
Since Congress did not specifically enumerate or define those entities,
then, according to FERC, its anti-manipulation authority applies to any
and all entities.
FERC’s interpretation of Congress’ silence is misplaced. If
Congress had used a defined term, it may have resulted in a class of
covered entities smaller than the universe of NGA-jurisdictional entities
that were contemplated in the NGA’s jurisdictional provision, § 1(b).
Furthermore, a narrowly defined term might fail to capture certain
existing businesses in the transportation and sales chain or new business
not yet envisioned that, once created, would otherwise have fallen
within the class of covered entities.
Before the enactment of EPAct, NGA § 1(b) provided that FERC’s
powers applied, for example, to natural gas transportation companies,
sellers, and resellers in interstate commerce. 34 However, EPAct
amended NGA § 1(b) to also cover persons engaged in “the importation
or exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce.”35 Had Congress not
used more expansive language, these newly covered “persons” and
possibly some of the entities that are explicitly listed in FERC’s
jurisdictional provision, would not have been subject to the new antimanipulation powers.36 Thus, Congress likely intended to expand the
scope of the entities subject to FERC’s anti-manipulation authority, but
only to the extent of those jurisdictional entities contemplated prior to
the enactment of EPAct, as well as those entities engaged in the
importation and exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce. The
legislative history of EPAct does not suggest that Congress intended
more. 37 Therefore, attempts by FERC to regulate “any entity,”
including those operating in financial markets, reach well beyond
FERC’s congressionally-authorized jurisdictional boundaries.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 480.
Natural Gas Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2006).
See Demarest, supra note 13, at 488–89.
Id. at 495.
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b. FERC’s Reliance on the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 and its Interpretation of
“in Connection with” are Overly Broad
FERC has interpreted “in connection with” to mean that it has
broad jurisdiction over entities that engage in conduct affecting its
subject matter jurisdiction.38 In other words, FERC seeks to assert its
jurisdiction wherever “there is a ‘nexus’ between the manipulative
conduct and [a FERC] jurisdictional transaction.” 39 Thus, based on
FERC’s interpretation, it would have authority to assert jurisdiction over
“conduct [in financial markets] that has only a tenuous, if any, tie to
what the FPA and NGA delineate as FERC-jurisdictional
transactions.”40
To reach its conclusion, FERC relied heavily upon the Exchange
Act, specifically § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as their judicial
precedents.41 However, FERC’s analysis of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
its determination regarding its applicability to the NGA, is flawed on
several grounds: (i) FERC’s interpretation of “in connection with” is
inconsistent with the use of the phrase in other sections of the NGA; (ii)
courts have rejected FERC’s view that the “in connection with” standard
allows it to assert jurisdiction over parties engaging in conduct outside
of its jurisdiction; and (iii) the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a broad
interpretation of the phrase “in connection with” in Rule 10b-5, but has
explicitly required that the fraud must be coincident to a sale of
securities to prevail on a § 10(b) claim.42
First, FERC’s interpretation of “in connection with” is not
consistent with the use of the phrase in other sections of the NGA.43
Contrary to FERC’s assertion, the phrase “in connection with” does not
grant FERC power to police manipulation beyond its jurisdictional
boundaries. 44 This view is consistent with the court’s conclusion
reached in Conoco Inc. v. FERC.45 In Conoco, the court considered the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,072.
Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 3.
Id. at 2.
See generally Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,074–76.
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820–22 (2002).
See Brief of Petitioner at 52–55, Hunter v. FERC, 403 F. App’x 525 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 10-1017), 2010 WL 5779115, at *37–40 [hereinafter In re Hunter Petitioner
Brief].
44. Id. at 53.
45. 90 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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phrase “in connection with” that appears elsewhere in the NGA. 46
FERC argued that the language authorized it to “regulate facilities that it
has expressly found are not within its [NGA] §1 (b) jurisdiction.”47 The
court rejected FERC’s argument and held that “the ‘in connection with’
language . . . neither expand[s] [FERC’s] jurisdiction, nor override[s]
[NGA] §1 (b) . . . .”48
Second, courts have rejected FERC’s view that the “in connection
with” standard used in § 10(b) allows FERC to assert jurisdiction over
parties engaging in conduct outside of its jurisdiction. For example, in
Ontario Public Service Employees Union Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel
Networks Corp., 49 the court rejected arguments that the antimanipulation provisions of § 10(b) covered purchases and sales of
“any” securities even though the statute was “intended to be construed
flexibly.50 Instead, the court held that the alleged misrepresentation by
one company that merely “affected” the price of another company’s
securities was insufficient to give the plaintiffs standing to sue under §
10(b) or Rule 10b-5.51 Employing the § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 standard in
the context of energy markets presumably would yield the same result.
In other words, misconduct that occurs in financial markets and
incidentally affects prices within energy markets would be well beyond
the intended reach of the statute.
Equally compelling are the findings of the court in Leykin v. AT&T
Corp.,52 which explained that “[n]ot all conduct that negatively affects a
company’s stock price is actionable as a federal securities fraud. The
scheme to defraud must coincide with the sale of the securities.”53 The
court further noted that “[c]onduct that is merely incidental or
tangentially related to the sale of securities will not meet the ‘in
connection with’ requirement.”54
Third, the Supreme Court has adopted a broad interpretation of the
phrase “in connection with” in Rule 10b-5, but has explicitly required
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 552.
In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 52–53.
Id.
369 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34; see Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 3.
423 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002)).
Id. (citing Ling v. Deutsche Bank, AG, No. 04 Civ. 4566 (HB), 2005 WL
1244689, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2005)).
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that the fraud be coincident to a sale of securities.55 FERC relies upon
SEC v. Zandford for the proposition that § 10(b) should be construed in
a broad and flexible manner to accomplish the far-reaching and remedial
purpose of the statute. 56 FERC, however, fails to point out that the
Court asserted that the application of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not
without limit. 57 Critically, the Supreme Court cautioned “that ‘in
connection with’ must not be construed so broadly as to convert every
common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation of
§ 10(b).”58 In United States v. O’Hagan,59 the Supreme Court stated that
the requisite showing is “deception ‘in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security,’ not deception of an identifiable purchaser or
seller.”60 Thus, applying § 10(b) to natural gas transactions—rather than
to securities—means that FERC’s authority to police manipulation must
be coincident to a sale of natural gas. 61 Transactions in financial
markets are independent of physical markets and, therefore, are not
coincident to sales of natural gas.62 Accordingly, FERC’s reliance on §
10(b) does not provide a basis for it to gain jurisdiction over financial
markets, even if there is an incidental impact on physical markets.63
C. FERC’S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ORDER 670
ARE ULTRA VIRES
Order 670, § 1.c.1 codifies for rulemaking purposes FERC’s
prohibition of natural gas market manipulation based on its
interpretation of the NGA § 4A amendment.64 A corollary provision is
provided for the purchase and sale of electricity in § 1.c.2 for the FPA §
222 amendment. 65 FERC claims that the language of its own
55.
56.

SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002); see Leykin, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 241.
See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,074–75 (citing Zandford,
535 U.S. at 819 & Superintendant of Ins. of the State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971)).
57. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820.
58. Id.
59. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
60. Id. at 658.
61. See generally In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at *40.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2012).
65. See Philip H. Hilder & Scott L. Mullins, Attack of the Clone: FERC’s AntiManipulation Rule Uses SEC Tools, in AN ABA-CLE PUBLICATION ON WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 2008, at K-2 (2008); see also Demarest, supra note 13, at 482.
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rulemaking expands its jurisdictional reach beyond its statutory
boundaries and allows it to reach behavior in financial markets that has
an impact on physical markets. 66 However, FERC’s argument is not
persuasive. If the NGA and FPA are limited in scope, so too are rules
adopted by FERC to codify Congress’ statutory mandate.67 “One of the
most revered principles of administrative law, after all, is that an agency
cannot . . . extend the reach of its jurisdiction beyond that encompassed
by statute.” 68 Accordingly, without a corresponding amendment to
NGA § 1(b) (and the corresponding provision in the FPA) to expand
FERC’s jurisdiction, FERC’s interpretation and application of Order
670 was made in excess of its delegated powers and is therefore ultra
vires.69
II. EVEN IF FERC’S JURISDICTION EXTENDS BEYOND THE
BOUNDARIES OF NGA §1(B) (AND ITS COROLLARY IN THE FPA), IT
DOES NOT EXTEND SO FAR AS TO ENCROACH UPON THE JURISDICTION
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATED BY OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES,
EVEN IF CONDUCT HAS AN EFFECT ON PHYSICAL MARKETS
A. THE CFTC HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER FUTURES
TRANSACTIONS
Prior to 1974, multiple state and federal agencies regulated
commodities futures trading. 70 As a result, market participants were
often subjected to conflicting regulations and agency rulings. 71 To
minimize duplicative oversight and conflicting rulings, Congress
enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
(which amended the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”)), to (a)
create and centralize the regulation of futures with the CFTC; (b)
empower the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over futures transactions
and futures contracts; and (c) state in plain terms that the CFTC’s
66. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) (order to
show cause).
67. See Hilder & Mullins, supra note 65, at K-3.
68. See Sharon Brown-Hruska & Robert Zwirb, CFTC & FERC vs. Amaranth:
Doing the Sister Regulator Act, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Oct. 2007, at 1.
69. See Griffith v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 492–94 (D.C. Cir.
1988); see also In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 35.
70. See 120 CONG. REC. S16, 127–28 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1974).
71. See In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 25.
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jurisdiction over futures transactions and futures contracts markets
preempts other state and federal regulatory authorities. 72 Thus,
Congress was clear about the breadth and scope of the CFTC’s
jurisdiction. The plain language of the statutory text, its legislative
history, and over thirty-five years of case law leaves little doubt that
Congress intended to and did in fact confer upon the CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction over futures transactions. Therefore, any claims by FERC
that it has any jurisdiction whatsoever over futures transactions is
inconsistent with Congress’ intent.
1. The Statutory Text of CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) Is Explicit and Clear
The Supreme Court has stated that its “analysis begins with the
language of the statute. And where the statutory language provides a
clear answer, it ends there as well.”73 CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) provides, in
pertinent part, that the CFTC shall have “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with
respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving” futures
contracts “traded or executed” on CFTC-licensed exchanges, called
designated contracts.74 The plain reading of the statute makes it clear
that Congress granted to the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures
transactions.
FERC has acknowledged the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction over
futures transactions, but seeks to distinguish manipulative futures
trading as not falling within that exclusive jurisdiction. 75 FERC’s
argument is, however, without merit. Industry Associations agree that
where “Congress intended to limit the broad grant of [the] CFTC[‘s]
exclusive jurisdiction, it expressly” did so by amending the CEA.76 For
example, Congress explicitly granted to the SEC authority over certain
kinds of options 77 and security futures products. 78 Significantly, the

72. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 101(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. §
2(a)(1)(A) (2006).
73. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (internal citations
omitted).
74. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(a) (2006).
75. See Corrected Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association et al. in
Support of Petitioner & Intervenor at 24, Hunter v. FERC, 403 F. App’x 525 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 10-1017), 2010 WL 5779118, at *14 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of
Futures Industry Association].
76. Id. at 25.
77. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(C).
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express grant of authority to the SEC came only after it settled
jurisdictional differences with the CFTC.79 Before those jurisdictional
differences were settled, courts recognized that futures and securities
markets were converging, yet repeatedly held that even where the
underlying commodity was a security, the CFTC maintained jurisdiction
over futures transactions.80 Even in situations where the SEC disagreed
with how the CFTC regulated the futures markets, the courts suggested
that any such concerns were not the SEC’s business, but rather a matter
for Congress.81 It was only following a series of studies, negotiations,
and settlements that Congress eventually confirmed the CFTC’s
authority over options and security futures products, while granting veto
authority to the SEC over new stock index futures contracts approved by
the CFTC. 82 “Notably, Congress has never enacted an explicit
exemption [or carve-out] from [the CFTC’s] exclusive jurisdiction [in
favor of] FERC as it did for the SEC . . . .” 83 In accordance with
prevailing practices, “[i]n circumstances where Congress has enacted an
explicit exemption for one agency, but not other agencies, courts should
not read into the statute an exemption for those agencies.”84
2. Legislative History Leaves No Doubt About Congress’ Intent
The statutory text granting exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC is
clear and unambiguous, and its exceptions and exclusions are explicitly
stated. 85 However, if there remains any doubt about the breadth and
scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction, the legislative history is replete with
evidence of Congress’ intent. 86
Specifically, when the 1974
amendments were enacted, the Conference Committee, Senate
Chairman and House Committee Chairman were all in agreement in
78. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(D); see id. § 2(c) (carving out an
exemption for non-retail foreign currency transactions through the Treasury
Amendment).
79. See Jerry Markham, Merging the SEC & CFTC – A Clash of Cultures, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 537, 570 (2009).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 574 & n.205 (citing Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir.
1999).
82. Id. at 569–71.
83. Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 27.
84. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002).
85. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A).
86. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1383 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
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echoing Congress’ intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the
CFTC.87
The Conference Committee articulated that “the [CFTC]’s
jurisdiction over futures contract markets . . . is exclusive . . . and the
[CFTC]’s jurisdiction, where applicable, supersedes State as well as
Federal agencies.” 88 Furthermore, “[u]nder the exclusive grant of
jurisdiction to the [CFTC], the authority of the [CEA] . . . would
preempt the field insofar as futures regulation is concerned.” 89 The
Senate Committee Chairman asserted that by “establishing [the CFTC],
it [was] the Committee’s intent to give it exclusive jurisdiction over
those areas delineated in the [CEA].”90 The objective, he explained, was
to “assure that the affected entities—exchanges, traders, customers, et
cetera—will not be subject to conflicting agency rulings.” 91 House
Committee Chairman Poage underscored the point, stating that the
provision was adopted “in an attempt to avoid unnecessary, overlapping
and duplicative regulation.”92
Given the plain meaning of the statutory text and the clarity with
which the legislative history reflects Congress’ intent, it is clear that the
CFTC’s jurisdiction is exclusive. Accordingly, other federal agencies,
such as FERC, may not encroach upon that jurisdiction without express
Congressional authorization. Courts agree with this view, having
repeatedly recognized and reaffirmed the CFTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction.93
3. Case Law Confirms CFTC’s Exclusive Jurisdiction
Decades of case law strongly support the conclusion that the
CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction over futures markets is indisputable. The
prevailing view is that “[a]ll U.S. futures trading in all goods and articles
(except onions), including sources of energy, like natural gas, is subject

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
120 CONG. REC. 30,459 (1974) (statement of Sen. Comm. Chairman
Talmadge); see id. at 34,736.
91. Id. at 30,459.
92. Id. at 34,736 (statement of H. Comm. Chairman Poage).
93. SEC v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976); FTC v.
Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d
1137 (7th Cir. 1982); Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
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to the CEA’s regulatory apparatus.”94 It does not matter whether the
underlying instrument would, on a stand-alone basis, be subject to the
jurisdiction of another agency.95 In fact, at least one court has held that
the existence of futures is a “zero-sum game” because of the CFTC’s
exclusivity. 96 The court stated: “an instrument either is or is not a
futures contract. If it is, the CFTC has jurisdiction; if it is not, the CFTC
lacks jurisdiction; if the CFTC has jurisdiction, its power is exclusive.”97
FERC has argued that the CFTC does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over manipulative conduct involving futures.98 In support of
its position, FERC relies heavily upon FTC v. Ken Roberts Co.
(“Roberts”)99 and points to the court’s comment that “while the CFTC
has the clear statutory authority to regulate a [trader’s] deceitful
‘practices’ . . . there is no reason to think that this authority is exclusive.
A ‘practice’ or ‘course of business’ is quite plainly not a ‘transaction’ . .
. [as contemplated by the statute].”100 FERC’s reliance on the court’s
comment in isolation is misleading and fails entirely when considering
the facts of Roberts and the court’s decision.101 Roberts in fact supports
the argument that the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction applies to all actual
futures trading and all transactions involving futures. 102 The court
distinguished marketing materials relating to futures from the actual
trading of futures.103 The marketing materials that were the subject of
the ‘practice’ and ‘course of business’ referred to in that case were
determined to be outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. 104
However, the court was decisive in explaining that “a set of actions
closely linked to the actual trading of commodities” falls squarely within
the CFTC’s jurisdiction. 105 Thus, whenever there is a transaction

94. Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 16
(citation omitted).
95. Id. at 34.
96. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 547.
97. Id.
98. Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,068.
99. 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
100. Id. at 591.
101. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 30–
31.
102. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 589–91.
104. Id. at 591–92.
105. Id. at 591.
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involving futures contracts, the CFTC’s jurisdiction supersedes that of
any other agency claiming that it has jurisdiction.106
4. The “Enron Loophole”
Through exemptions and exclusions, Congress has carved out
certain products and transactions from most requirements of the CEA.107
In addition to those exemptions discussed earlier for certain options and
securities futures products, Congress has excluded or exempted certain
categories of other commodities and transactions that could be legally
traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets, subjecting them to varying
degrees of regulation and in some cases, minimal CFTC oversight.108
One of those exemptions, codified in CEA §2(h)(3), allowed for
substantial volumes of trading in OTC energy contracts and provided the
basis for the alleged misconduct by Enron Corporation and Amaranth
Advisers.109
a. The Origin of the Enron Loophole
Prior to 2000, a number of hybrid products were created that
contained futures-like characteristics but also contained elements of
other financial instruments that were traditionally outside of the CFTC’s
jurisdiction.110 Many of these products were not exchange-traded and
were utilized by market participants in bilateral transactions. 111 As
discussed earlier, some of these new products led to jurisdictional
battles, for example, between the CFTC and SEC. 112 Absent an
exemption or exclusion, these new products—if determined to be
subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction—would have been subject to the
CFTC’s exchange trading requirement.113 Market participants argued,
however, that an exchange-trading requirement would have resulted in

106. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982); see also
Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
107. See generally MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON
LOOPHOLE 2 (2008).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Markham, supra note 79, at 570.
113. See Pantano & Schonback, supra note 9, at 4.
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an economic burden that would have outweighed the social utility of the
products.114
In Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. North American Petroleum,115
the court concluded that the hybrid products were in fact subject to the
CFTC’s jurisdiction and therefore subject to the CEA’s exchangetrading requirements as well. 116 However, the court recognized that
most users of the hybrid products were sophisticated parties who do not
need the same level of protection as sophisticated parties.117 Weighing
the social utility of the products against the costs borne by market
participants if the products were required to be exchange-traded,
Congress enacted the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (“FTPA”)
giving the CFTC authority to exempt various energy contracts and
hybrid instruments from the CFTC’s jurisdiction. 118 Once the CFTC
granted the exemption, market participants were able to enter into
bilateral contracts in OTC transactions without the costs of their
exchange-traded counterparts.119
As the OTC market grew, the CFTC sought greater authority to
police those markets. 120 Congress, however, did not believe that
additional oversight was necessary and enacted the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), which exempted “two classes of
transactions from most substantive CFTC regulation. First, bilateral
contracts between ‘eligible contract participants’ that are not executed
on a trading facility . . . . Second, contracts in exempt commodities
between ‘eligible commercial entities’ that are executed on an
‘electronic trading facility’.” 121 Congress presumed that “most OTC
financial derivatives were not susceptible to manipulation and that the
counterparties in such transactions did not need the same protections as
smaller, unsophisticated market participants who relied on
intermediaries to conduct their transactions.”122
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Markham, supra note 79, at 574–75.
738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 1493.
Id. at 1492.
See Markham, supra note 79, at 575 (citing the Futures Trading Practices Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590, 3629 (1992)).
119. Id. at 575, 580–81.
120. Id. at 580–81.
121. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE 2
(2008).
122. Markham, supra note 79, at 581.
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When Enron collapsed in 2001, it had allegedly exploited the
exemptions by trading considerable amounts of physical energy and
derivatives contracts on OTC electronic markets. 123 The exemptions
subsequently became known as the “Enron Loophole,” presumably
because it allowed for significant levels of trading in futures outside the
purview of the CFTC.124
b. The Enron Loophole Has Been Closed
Amaranth Advisers, LLC was a large hedge fund whose primary
business was investing in speculative energy trades on The New York
Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”). 125 NYMEX is a futures trading
exchange registered with, and regulated by, the CFTC.126 Concerned
with the potential for large losses, NYMEX required Amaranth to
reduce its positions on the exchange. 127 Amaranth complied, but
allegedly engaged in regulatory arbitrage by taking advantage of the
Enron Loophole to shift its positions to an OTC exempt contract market
(“ECM”) known as the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”). 128 Like
Enron, Amaranth subsequently collapsed and lost $6 billion as a result
of questionable trading practices.129
Responding to Enron and Amaranth, Congress enacted the CFTC
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (also known as the “ICE Amendments”).130
The ICE Amendments modified CEA § 2(h) “to provide for CFTC
regulation of electronic trading facilities that offer ‘significant price
discovery contracts’ in exempt commodities.” 131 Significant price
discovery contracts are those:

123. Id. at 586. See also HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 19; MARK JICKLING,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE (2008).
124. See Markham, supra note 79, at 586.
125. See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) (order to
show cause); see also Markham, supra note 79, at 583–84.
126. Commodity Exchange Act § 5.
127. See Markham, supra note 79, at 600.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 was enacted as Title XIII of the Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 13101–13204, 122
Stat. 923, 1427–1442 (2008). The Act is often referred to as the “Farm Bill.”
131. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE 4
(2008).
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(i) [W]ith a settlement price linked to a regulated market’s contract,
(ii) that may be the subject of arbitrage trading involving exchangelisted contracts, (iii) that are traded in sufficient volume to have an
effect on other market prices, or (iv) that are used as a reference
point for pricing transactions in other markets. Once the CFTC
determines that a contract meets one or more of these criteria, the
electronic trading facility becomes subject to exchange-like
132
regulation.

In its action against Amaranth, FERC argued that the CFTC did not
have exclusive jurisdiction over manipulation in cases involving exempt
commodities.133 The primary basis for FERC’s claim of jurisdiction and
its action against Amaranth was that Amaranth’s trading practices had a
direct link to the prices of natural gas in physical markets. 134 Given
Congress’ explicit requirement to include “significant price discovery
contracts” in exempt commodities within the scope of the CFTC’s
exclusive jurisdiction, FERC would have no basis whatsoever to make
such claims against Amaranth if the ICE Amendments were in place at
the time of Amaranth’s alleged misconduct.135 However, the fact that
the ICE Amendments were enacted after Amaranth’s alleged
misconduct presumably could have raised the question of whether the
CFTC had jurisdiction over the alleged misconduct before the ICE
Amendments.
FERC’s rationale is based on the fact that under the CFMA, the
CFTC had little substantive regulatory authority over exempt
commodities and excluded commodities traded on ECMs.136 Indeed, the
ECMs were relieved of most registration, reporting, and certain other
substantive requirements.137 FERC, however, failed to acknowledge that
the CFTC maintained authority over fraudulent and manipulative
conduct arising in exempt markets for exempt and excluded
commodities.138 Therefore, the CFTC, not FERC, had jurisdiction over

132.
133.
134.

Id.
Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 1, at 62,077–78.
See generally Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) (order to
show cause); see also Markham, supra note 79, at 583–84.
135. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON
LOOPHOLE 4 (2008).
136. See id. at 3.
137. Id.; see Markham, supra note 79, at 582.
138. Horwich, supra note 29, at 374.
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Amaranth’s alleged manipulative conduct occurring on the regulated
NYMEX, as well as the exempt contract market, ICE.
5. CFTC/FERC Memorandum of Understanding Neither Limits CFTC’s
Jurisdiction, Nor Expands FERC’s Jurisdiction
Before the CFTC and SEC resolved their jurisdictional dispute over
options and security futures products, Congress required that the CFTC
“maintain communications” with the SEC and other federal authorities
because it recognized that futures and securities markets had become
somewhat intertwined. 139 That requirement, however, did not divest the
CFTC of its exclusive jurisdiction over those products, nor did it grant
to the SEC an expanded jurisdiction or additional powers. 140 Until
Congress provided an explicit exception for the SEC over certain
options and security futures products, jurisdiction remained with the
CFTC.141
Similarly, Congress mandated that the CFTC and FERC enter into
a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) pursuant to which the
parties were required to communicate, share information, and coordinate
investigations.142 More specifically, “the MOU requires the agencies to
coordinate their discovery requests; to share information; maintain
confidentiality [in most instances]; and to meet regularly.” 143 In
addition, each agency is required to refer to the other potential violations
that are within the jurisdiction of the other agency.144 According to the
Congressional mandate and the specific terms of the MOU, there is no
basis to suggest that Congress intended to alter either agency’s
jurisdiction. 145 To the contrary, Congress recognizes the independent
jurisdiction of each agency and requires them to communicate and share
information in the same manner that was required to resolve earlier

139.
140.
141.
142.

Markham, supra note 79, at 569.
Brown-Hruska & Zwirb, supra note 68, at 5–6.
Id.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the FERC and CFTC Regarding
Information Sharing and Treatment of Proprietary Trading and Other Information (Oct.
12, 2005), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/mou.asp. See Press
Release, CFTC, CFTC Chairman Jeffrey and FERC Chairman Kelliher Sign MOU on
Information Sharing, Confidentiality (Oct. 12, 2005), available at www.cftc.gov/opa/
press05/opa5127-05.htm.
143. See Hilder & Mullins, supra note 65, at K-4.
144. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 19, at 3.
145. Brown-Hruska & Zwirb, supra note 68, at 6.
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jurisdictional disputes between the CFTC and the SEC. 146 The
jurisdictional lines were not re-drawn as a result of the mandate to
“maintain communications,” 147 and contrary to FERC’s assertions,
FERC’s jurisdiction has not been expanded as a result of the MOU.
Accordingly, the MOU does not empower FERC to pursue any and
all claims of manipulation simply because such conduct may have had
an impact on prices in physical markets. The more prudent view is that
the information sharing requirement equips FERC with additional tools
to (i) ensure that rates within its jurisdiction are “just and reasonable”
and “not unduly discriminatory,” and (ii) pursue manipulation that
occurs in the purchase or sale of physical energy in interstate commerce,
as well as that which occurs in the importation and exportation of
natural gas in foreign commerce. FERC’s jurisdiction has not been
expanded to permit an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of other
federal agencies. 148 If manipulation or wrongful conduct occurs in a
market regulated by another federal agency but has an impact on prices
in physical energy markets, FERC’s recourse, responsibility, and
Congressional mandate is to correct the artificial price movements to
ensure they are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.149
B. THE SEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER SECURITIES MARKETS
Whereas the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over futures markets,
the SEC has jurisdiction over securities markets.150 Together, the CFTC
and SEC regulate the vast majority of financial markets. However,
unlike the CFTC and FERC, the SEC does not have a limiting
jurisdictional mandate.151 It is possible, however, that certain financial
instruments that fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction could impact prices in
physical energy markets. That does not mean, however, that FERC
would have jurisdiction over conduct that occurs within the SEC’s
jurisdiction.
For example, it is conceivable that illegal or manipulative short
sales could adversely impact the price of a particular energy company’s
146.
147.
148.

See generally Markham, supra note 79, at 569–70.
Id. at 570.
See Brown-Hruska & Zwirb, supra note 68, at 5–6; see also In re Hunter
Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 49.
149. See FERC Strategic Plan – FERC’s Mission, supra note 2, at 3.
150. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
151. Demarest, supra note 13, at 479–80.
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stock. Market fears and concerns about energy supplies could cause
energy prices to rise to artificial levels that do not reflect the realities of
supply and demand. Does this mean then that FERC is empowered to
exercise jurisdiction over illegal or manipulative short sales? Although
the illegal or manipulative conduct may have impacted prices in
physical markets, the SEC—not FERC—would retain jurisdiction over
the matter. FERC, however, would be empowered to correct the pricing
anomalies to ensure that rates within its jurisdiction are “just and
reasonable,” whereas the SEC would pursue claims against the
wrongdoer.
C. FERC’S ENCROACHMENT INTO FINANCIAL MARKETS TO POLICE
MANIPULATION IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
FERC’s encroachment into financial markets would result in
unnecessary costs, duplicative regulation, potentially conflicting legal
standards, and multi-agency enforcement actions for the same conduct.
Surely, that is not a result that Congress intended when it delegated
regulatory authority over financial markets. In the futures markets, for
example, Congress asserted that the CEA’s purpose was to serve the
public interest through a system of effective self-regulation under the
oversight of the CFTC which would, among other things, “deter and
prevent price manipulation or any other disruptions to market
integrity.”152 FERC itself has acknowledged that Congress delineated
“the responsibility for developing a coherent regulatory program for the
commodities industry and to prevent the costs and confusion associated
with multiple regulators.”153 Similarly, Congress created the SEC to
restrict speculation and abuses after it concluded that securities
exchanges were used for “transactions producing moral and economic
waste and corruption.”154 Thus, Congress created the CFTC and SEC
as independent federal agencies to regulate distinct aspects of financial
markets without overlapping jurisdiction, even though those markets
have converged in certain respects.155
FERC argues that its ability to police manipulation in financial
markets is “necessary in the public interest or for the protection of

152.
153.
154.
155.

7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2006).
New York Mercantile Exchange, 74 FERC ¶ 61,311 (1996).
H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 47 (1913).
See generally Markham, supra note 79, at 552; Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures
Industry Association, supra note 75, at 20.
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natural gas ratepayers.”156 However, the court rejected that argument in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission157 on the grounds that
FERC’s expansive reading of the relevant statute did not comply with
the jurisdictional limitations of NGA § 1(b).158 In fact, the court went so
far as to commend FERC for attempting to protect its market, but stated,
“it is not sufficient justification upon which to base an expansion of
[FERC’s powers] to activities clearly not within its terms.”159
FERC’s effort to police manipulation in financial markets is an
encroachment that would provide yet another layer of complexity and
confusion. FERC’s mission is to ensure that the rates charged for
wholesale sales of natural gas and electricity are “just and
reasonable.” 160 It is not a financial regulator and does not have the
specialized skills that Congress requires of its financial markets
regulators.161 Indeed, if FERC had jurisdiction in financial markets, it
would lead to a slippery slope where other federal agencies could also
claim jurisdiction within the financial landscape. Surely, Congress did
not intend to confound the regulatory landscape for financial markets
and promote duplicative and conflicting regulation. To do so would
result in increased complexity and costs for market participants and
federal regulators alike.
Congress did not intend for federal agencies to compete for power
and authority over regulated markets.162 To the contrary, where it was
within the public’s interest, Congress created federal agencies to carry
out specified functions and solve problems it had identified.163 Financial

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2006).
463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 263.
Id.
FERC Strategic Plan – FERC’s Mission, supra note 2, at 6.
See Amicus Curiae Brief of Futures Industry Association, supra note 75, at 18.
In re Hunter Petitioner Brief, supra note 43, at 47.
For example, the CFTC was established as the federal regulatory agency for
futures trading; the FERC was established to regulate interstate transmission of
electricity, natural gas, and oil; the SEC administers federal securities laws that seek to
protect investors, ensure securities markets are fair and honest, and provide the means
to enforce securities laws through sanctions; the FTC’s mission is to enhance consumer
welfare and protection competition, and prohibit business practices that are anticompetitive, deceptive or unfair to consumers. A host of other federal agencies exist,
each with its own unique mission. For a complete list of federal agencies and their
respective missions, see https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies.

2013]

FERC AND ANTI-MANIPULATION AUTHORITY

403

markets regulators were not created with overlapping jurisdiction. 164
However, even where Congress determined that it was prudent to
coordinate activities, it was done so with a view towards avoiding
duplication and unnecessary costs, not increasing complexity and
costs. 165 Any attempt by FERC to police manipulation in financial
markets would be contrary to Congress’ intent and inconsistent with
public policy because it would foster an environment polluted with
conflicting legal standards, duplicative regulation, unnecessary costs,
and unavoidable confusion.
CONCLUSION
FERC does not have, and should not have, authority to police
manipulation in financial markets even if that conduct has an impact on
prices in physical markets. FERC’s authority is statutorily limited in
scope. FERC’s primary mission is to protect natural gas and electricity
consumers from exploitation by natural gas companies and electric
utilities and to ensure that rates charged for wholesale sales are just and
reasonable.166 FERC was not created as a financial regulator and has no
basis, statutory or otherwise, to encroach upon the jurisdiction of federal
agencies charged with regulating financial markets, namely the CFTC
and SEC. Any attempts to extend FERC’s jurisdiction to financial
markets would be inconsistent with public policy and undermine
Congress’ intent to minimize duplicative oversight, conflicting agency
regulations and rulings, and unnecessary costs.

164.
165.
166.

See Markham, supra note 79, at 569–70.
Id. at 589.
Horwich, supra note 29, at 366; see also Order Denying Rehearing, supra note
1, at 62,069–70.

